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Abstract 
In this paper we consider inflation rate differentials between seven Central and Eastern Countries 
(CEECs) and the Eurozone. We focus explicitly upon a group of CEECs given that although they 
are already member states, they are currently not part of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) and must fulfil the Maastricht convergence criteria before being able to adopt the euro. 
However, this group of countries does not have an opt-out clause and so must eventually adopt 
the single currency. Hence, considering divergence in inflation rates between each country and 
the Eurozone is important in that evidence of persistent differences may increase the chance of 
asymmetric inflationary shocks. Furthermore, once a country joins the Eurozone the operation of 
a country specific monetary policy is no longer an option. We explicitly test for convergence in 
the inflation rate differentials, incorporating non-linearities in the autoregressive parameters, 
fractional integration with endogenous structural changes, and also consider club convergence 
analysis for the CEECs over the period 1997 to 2011 based on monthly data. Our empirical 
findings suggest that the majority of countries experience non-linearities in the inflation rate 
differential, however there is only evidence of a persistent difference in three out of the seven 
countries. Complementary to this analysis we apply the Phillips and Sul (2007) test for club 
convergence and find that there is evidence that most of the CEECs converge to a common 
steady state. 
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1. Introduction and background 
Enlargement of the euro area is probably one of the most prominent topics within the 
European Union (EU) agenda. This is not surprising after the problems that Greece has 
experienced (and is still undergoing) and the questioning of their preparation in 1999, for 
adopting the euro back in 2001. Arguably, if Greece still had flexibility in their exchange 
rate policy then perhaps their current debt crisis could have been avoided. During 2011 
the Eurozone has experienced unprecedented turmoil, which raises further questions 
about whether the euro area has ever been an optimum currency area. The focus of this 
paper is to address whether or not it is a good idea to encourage more member states to 
adopt the common currency, in particular the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs). Most of the CEECs which are already member states still have to fulfill the 
Maastricht convergence criteria so as to be able to join the euro area.1 However, fulfilling 
the Maastricht nominal convergence criteria may not be enough to grant a future free of 
turbulence within euroland.  
 Given the commitment from the European Central Bank (ECB) for price stability 
and the current target to tackle inflation,2 losing monetary policy may be especially 
problematic if the countries face so-called asymmetric shocks. That is, shocks affecting 
different countries in a different manner, and hence, causing a problem of 
synchronisation of income, inflation and unemployment rates, which potentially will 
require different policy responses. This is particularly important in a monetary union, 
since it implies losing the possibility of intervention in the exchange rate market to 
depreciate the currency, or the option of financing deficits by monetary expansions.  
                                                           
1
 Details on the criteria can be found in www.ecb.int/ecb/history/enlargement/html/faqenlarge.en.html#l4. 
2
 The primary objective of the ECB’s monetary policy is to maintain price stability. The ECB aims at 
inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. 
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 Hence, in this paper we investigate whether a common monetary policy decided 
by the ECB would be appropriate to the new EU countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe. The process of transition from communism towards that of a free market has 
been intense during the last 20 years, following a series of structural and political 
reforms. However, whether this process has facilitated conditions favourable to economic 
convergence is open to debate. Currently, it is unknown whether their inflation rates have 
converged to the same cycle and level as that of the Eurozone.  Hence, applying the same 
monetary policy to an area where different countries have different inflation rates, may 
be detrimental for some economies. Whereas the inflation rates of Germany, Luxemburg 
and the Netherlands may be relatively low and stable, Central and Eastern European 
countries still face high and volatile inflation rates, due to expasionary fiscal policies, 
aiming at boosting the process of convergence in GDP per capita. Consequently, it is 
questionable whether a central institution with the monopoly of supplying money (i.e. the 
European Central Bank ECB) and which decides a uniform monetary policy is beneficial 
for all countries. 
 Although the optimum currency areas theory establishes the necessary conditions 
for the success of a monetary union (see Mundell, 1961), in this paper we focus on the 
possibility of asymmetric shocks and their effects upon inflation. Mundell (1961) showed 
the importance of facing symmetric macro shocks in a currency union composed of 
different countries or regions. It is also clear that the degree of factor productivity within 
the EU is quite unequal (see Table 1), and, hence, analysing the (a)symmetry of shocks to 
inflation becomes of paramount importance when deciding about the appropriateness of 
adopting the European single currency. GDP per capita, which is a proxy for labour 
productivity, of all of the CEECs is well below the EU-27 average with Bulgaria and 
Romania being the worst cases. Hence, it is debateable what would happen if those 
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countries with lower income per capita embraced expansionary policies to improve the 
productivity of their production factors. Lehmann and Muravyev (2009) examine CEECs 
labour markets in comparison to that of the EU and reveal differences in terms of labour 
market policies and economic performance, which may hinder a uniform response to 
economic shocks. In addition to this, Figure 2 shows the budget balance as a percentage 
of the GDP for our target countries. Some countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland have been running constant deficits during the sample period, and some 
others have been more affected by the financial crisis, 2007 onwards. In this situation, an 
autonomous monetary policy may be beneficial in order to correct the effects of these 
asymmetric shocks on the public deficit. 
 Inflation expectations are a key macroeconomic variable when deciding the 
appropriate monetary policy to adopt.3 This is the base of the Lucas critique; central 
banks need to enhance credibility. Persistent differences in inflation rates within the 
monetary union may affect real interest rates, thus, creating important disparities in 
inflation expectations within the Union, thereby increasing the likelihood of asymmetric 
inflationary shocks (Busetti et al., 2007). Also, price differentials within an integrated 
monetary area can be seen as differences in external competitiveness, and hence is a 
useful way to test for asymmetric shocks, since exchange rate policy is no longer 
available to depreciate the currency and encourage exports. Nevertheless, there are other 
ways to test for the possibility of asymmetric shocks than using inflation differentials, 
such as business cycle synchronisation (see, Cuestas et al. 2011, amongst many others). 
However, given that the Maastricht criteria clearly establishes the importance of the 
inflation convergence criterion, and that the ECB medium term inflation target is clearly 
                                                           
3
 Taylor and McNabb (2007) showed the importance of individuals’ expectations and business confidence 
in predicting the economic cycle. More recently, Gelper and Croux (2010) considered the role of a 
European Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) in forecasting economic activity and find that the ESI is a 
useful barometer of the economy. Hence, proper management of expectations becomes of paramount 
importance in economic policy. 
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defined,4 we believe that inflation convergence is arguably the most appropriate and 
compelling means of assessing preparation to adopt the single currency.  
The sample of countries considered in this paper consists of CEECs which are 
member states but not part of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU), i.e. Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Most of these 
countries joined in 2004, with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania which joined in 
2007, and none of them joined with an opt-out clause. This means that eventually they all 
need to fulfil the Maastricht criteria and adopt the single European currency. One of the 
Maastricht criteria is that the candidate country should be a member of the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) for at least two years before adopting the euro. Only two 
countries, to date, the Baltic States Latvia and Lithuania, are in the ERM II.  
 The econometric techniques applied in this paper are related to the analysis of 
inflation convergence between these countries and the Eurozone. Assessing this 
hypothesis will allow us to provide valuable insights into the appropriateness of a 
centralised monetary policy, with no possibility of devaluations. More specifically, we 
test for the existence of unit roots in the inflation differentials for each country with 
respect to the Eurozone, accounting for the possibility of non-linearities in the data 
generation processes (DGPs), which may affect the speed of convergence, and also take 
into account the possibility of fractional integration incorporating breaks. Finally, we 
employ the recently developed club convergence tests (Phillips and Sul, 2007), to explore 
the robustness and gain additional insights from the analysis. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we 
summarise the convergence hypothesis definition used in this paper and the most recent 
                                                           
4
 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 127 (1) establishes that "Without prejudice 
to the objective of price stability", the Euro-system shall also "support the general economic policies in the 
Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union". These include inter 
alia "full employment" and "balanced economic growth", however, the ECB has focussed its monetary 
policy decisions on inflation control since its creation. 
6 
 
contributions on the empirical testing of this hypothesis within the EU. Section 3 
describes the econometric techniques applied in the paper, whilst in sections 4 and 5 we 
summarise the results and provide concluding remarks, respectively. 
2. The convergence hypothesis  
There are several definitions of economic convergence within the literature the most 
popular of which are the sigma-convergence (SC) by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and 
the long run convergence by Bernard and Durlauf (1995). 
 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) base their SC definition on the assumption that 
over time the differentials of income per head between two countries should decrease. 
Basically, and applied to inflation differentials, SC will imply that:  
 =  +  ,  with  < 1                                        (1) 
where  = , − ,, and with , and ,  as the inflation rates of country i and 
the Eurozone respectively.  
In a similar fashion, the Bernard and Durlauf (1995) definition of convergence 
implies that a set of income per capita converge if the long-term forecasts of the these 
variables are equal at a fixed time conditional on a set of available information Ω. 
Applied to the case of inflation convergence we have, 
lim→∞ (, − , |Ω = 0                                   (2) 
The popularity of these definitions of convergence is related to their ease of empirical 
testing. Both definitions can be empirically analysed by means of tests for the order of 
integration of  and by performing a cointegration test on the vector , − ,. 
Hence, the hypothesis of convergence will be accepted if the variables are stationary and 
revert to zero. 
 There are a number of authors who have tested whether there is evidence in 
favour of the convergence hypothesis within Europe, and the EMU in particular. An 
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important contribution, close to the date of the creation of the euro, is Kočenda and 
Papell (1997) who generally find results which are supportive of the convergence 
hypothesis for a number of EU member states and other industrialised countries, by 
means of unit root testing. Similar results are found by Camarero et al. (2000) who 
analysed the hypothesis of convergence for a number of peripheral EU countries, i.e. 
Italy, Spain and the UK, against Germany and the European average. Nevertheless, more 
recent contributions cast doubt on the convergence hypothesis in Europe. For instance, 
Holmes (2002) and Weber and Beck (2005) found that at the end of the period analysed, 
1972-1999 and 1991-2004, respectively, the dispersion in inflation rates had not 
decreased. An interesting recent contribution is Lopez and Papell (2011) who find 
evidence of different levels of persistence in inflation differentials within the EMU. In 
particular, they find that there is an increase in convergence of inflation rates within the 
EMU after the creation of the euro, and some mild dispersion in the inflation rates of 
peripheral countries towards the end of the period considered (1999m1-2006m12). 
 Turning to studies focussing on CEECs, to the best of our knowledge, only a few 
contributions have analysed the inflation convergence hypothesis. Kočenda (2001) 
analysed macroeconomic convergence in this area focussing on several key variables, i.e. 
real industrial output, money aggregate (M1), producer and consumer prices, and 
nominal and real interest rate spreads. However, the results for inflation rates are mixed, 
and depend on the groups of countries analysed. A recent contribution by Spiru (2008), 
analyses the convergence hypothesis for this group of countries. Applying unit root tests 
for panel data based upon linear DGPs, she finds supportive evidence towards the 
convergence hypothesis against the Eurozone for Cyprus, Estonia and Slovenia (which 
have already adopted the euro), and Latvia and Poland. She finds evidence of non-
linearities by means of applying linearity tests which are based upon the assumption of 
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stationary residuals. Hence, Spiru’s (2008) paper is an important starting point for 
understanding inflation convergence with the EMU.5 Finally, Staehr (2010) finds 
evidence supporting the hypothesis of price convergence within the ten new EU countries 
from central and eastern Europe. 
 In this paper we take into account the possibility of non-linearities in the DGPs, 
by, firstly, testing for the presence of non-linearities in inflation differentials by means of 
linearity tests when the order of integration is unknown, and, secondly, by incorporating 
those non-linearities into the analysis by means of unit root tests for non-linear models, 
fractional integration, structural breaks and club convergence analysis. 
3. Econometric methodology 
In order to empirically test for convergence between pairs of variables, it is common to 
apply tests for the order of integration of the differential between the variables. In this 
paper we apply a group of tests which we consider are appropriate given the expected 
DGPs of our target variable. Initially, we conduct tests for non-linearities followed by the 
appropriate unit root test over the inflation differential between each country and the 
Eurozone (details on the data are provided in Section 4), depending upon whether there is 
underlying non-linearity in the DGP; then, fractional integration and structural breaks are 
considered, and finally we examine the issue of club convergence. 
3.1 Non-linearities 
In the literature on applied macroeconomics and mean reversion, there is an important 
debate on the power of the tests when the DGP is not properly specified in the auxiliary 
regressions. For instance, the existence of non-acknowledged non-linearities in the DGP 
has been reported as a source of power problems in traditional unit root tests (e.g. 
Kapetanios et al., 2003). Hence, this situation may increase the likelihood of committing 
                                                           
5
 Cuestas and Harrison (2010) also test for inflation persistence in the CEECs. However, the authors do not 
provide a comparison with the EU or Eurozone. 
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Type II Errors, which implies a bias towards not rejecting the null hypothesis when it is 
false. The existence of non-linearities can be justified economically for our inflation 
differentials. The speed of mean reversion or convergence may depend on the size of the 
initial deviation. For greater deviations, the monetary authorities may apply measures in 
order to control the inflation rate. However, for small shocks, which have only mild 
effects on the inflation rate, the monetary authorities may decide that it is not worth 
applying any contractionary monetary policy. Such instances would potentially yield 
non-linearities. 
The most obvious approach to analyse this point is to test whether the process 
follows a linear or a non-linear process. However, traditional linearity tests such as the 
Granger and Teräsvirta (1993), Teräsvirta (1994) and Luukkonen et al. (1988) tests, are 
based upon the assumption that the variables are I(0), i.e. stationary. This is especially 
problematic in our framework, since the order of the integration is unknown. Thus, in a 
recent contribution, Harvey et al. (2008) propose a linearity test which can be applied 
either to I(0) or I(1) processes. These authors propose a Wald test when the order of 
integration is unknown, which is a weighted average of the Wald tests for the null of 
linearity when the variable is known to have a unit root and when it is known to be 
stationary I(0). Let’s suppose that  is a stationary I(0) process. To test for the null of 
linearity we need to specify the following auxiliary regression: 
   =  ! +   +  "" +  ## +  .                     (3) 
Under the null hypothesis of linearity we have $!:  " =  # = 0, and the alternative of 
nonlinearity, $:  " ≠ 0 ()*/,-  # ≠ 0. The Wald test for testing these hypotheses is 
given by: 
    .! = (/001 − /002 /0023  ,                     (4) 
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where RSSR and RSSU denote the residual sum of squares of the restricted, imposing $!, 
and the unrestricted regression for equation (3), respectively. The .! test follows the 
standard 4"(2 distribution, see Harvey et al. (2008).  However, if the variable  is 
nonstationary I(1), the auxiliary regression for the test becomes: 
        ∆ = 7∆ + 7"∆" + 7#∆# +  .                     (5) 
Under the null hypothesis of linearity in (5) we have  $!: 7" = 7# = 0, against the 
alternative of a nonlinear process of $: 7" ≠ 0 ()*/,- 7# ≠ 0. Similarly to .!, the 
Wald test for testing these hypotheses is given by: 
. = (/001 − /002 /0023   ,                                             (6) 
where RSSR and RSSU denote the residual sum of squares of the restricted, imposing $!, 
and the unrestricted regression for equation (5), respectively. The  . test also follows 
the standard 4"(2 distribution, see Harvey et al. (2008). Hence, the weighted averaged 
Wald test when the order of integration is unknown can be written as: 
.8 = (1 − 9.! + 9. :→  4"(2 ,                                           (7) 
where 9 converges in probability to 1 when the variable is I(1) and to 0 when the process 
is stationary. According to Harvey et al. (2008), 9 should be chosen as a combination of 
unit root and stationarity tests statistics.6  
3.2 Unit root tests 
Depending on whether it is possible to reject the null of linearity, we apply linear unit 
root tests, i.e. ADF tests, or non-linear unit root tests, in this case, following Sollis 
(2009). Sollis proposes a unit root test which takes into account the possibility of an 
autoregressive parameter, and hence the speed of mean reversion, dependent on the size 
of the deviations. This test is based upon the approach of Kapetanios et al. (2003), who 
                                                           
6
 See Harvey et al. (2008) for more details about λ. 
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propose a unit root test against the alternative of a globally stationary exponential smooth 
transition autoregression (ESTAR) model. The innovation of Sollis’ (2009) test is related 
to the fact that ESTAR functions only allow controlling for absolute deviations of the 
shocks from equilibrium, regardless of the sign of the shock, i.e. symmetry. However, 
Sollis (2009) incorporates in his test the possibility of analysing the existence of 
asymmetric effects, which means that negative shocks may have different effects, in 
absolute magnitude, than positive shocks. This is particularly relevant for the purpose of 
our analysis. It is well known that an increase in the inflation rate is more difficult to 
tackle than a reduction below the target. Hence, we expect that the speed of mean 
reversion would differ depending on the sign, not only the size, of the shock.  
Sollis’ (2009) test is based upon the following asymmetric ESTAR (AESTAR) 
model: 
∆ = ;(<, =0(<", > + 1 − 0(<", >"? + ,  (8) 
where 
;(<,  = 1 − @AB−<(" , with < ≥ 0                     (9) 
and  
0(<",  = D1 + @AB E−<"FG, with <" ≥ 0.                    (10) 
Hence, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be specified as $!: < = 0. However, under 
the null hypothesis, <, >
 
and  >", cannot be identified. Sollis (2009), by means of 
Taylor approximations, proposes testing for unit roots in this nonlinear framework using 
the following auxiliary equation:  
  ∆ =  # +  "H + @--,-.        (11) 
Thus, testing for unit roots in model (11) implies testing $!:   =  " = 0. Note that 
equation (11) may also incorporate lags of the dependent variable to control for 
autocorrelated residuals. Another innovation of Sollis’ (2009) approach is that, once the 
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null hypothesis of a unit root has been rejected, the null hypothesis of symmetric ESTAR 
versus the alternative of AESTAR can be tested. That is, it allows us to test for different 
effects, in absolute value, of positive and negative shocks on the variable. In this case, 
testing for the null hypothesis of symmetric ESTAR implies testing $!:  " = 0, by means 
of standard hypotheses tests.  
In order to explore the robustness of the analysis, we also analyse the convergence 
hypothesis by means of fractional integration tests. It is important to bear in mind that 
long memory processes, which need long periods of time to revert to equilibrium after a 
shock, may be wrongly classified as I(1) processes by conventional unit root tests. This is 
because the aforementioned unit root tests classify the variables as I(d), where d  is only 
allowed to be 0 or 1. Fractional integration tests break the dichotomy of d, since this 
parameter is allowed to take any real value. Thus, it may be 0, 1, but also any real value 
between 0 and 1 or even above 1. Hence, if d is between 0 and 0.5, the variable is 
stationary and mean reverting, whereas if d belongs to the interval [0.5, 1) the variable is 
non-stationary, but still mean reverting. If d ≥ 1, the variable is then non-stationary and 
non-mean-reverting. This has important implications for our analysis, since the degree of 
persistence is then determined by the estimation of d. Fractionally integrated or I(d) 
models can be specified as: 
         
(1 − I: = J,     K = 1, … , M                           (12) 
where ut is a covariance stationary I(0) process, whose spectral density function is 
positive and finite at the zero frequency. In this paper we apply several methods based on 
parametric, semiparametric and non-parametric techniques. Thus, we first employ 
Whittle estimates of d based on the frequency domain (Dahlhaus, 1989) along with a  
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) testing procedure developed by Robinson (1994). This latter 
method is very general in the sense that it allows us to test any real value of d, including 
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the stationary (d < 0.5) and nonstationary hypotheses (d ≥ 0.5) with no need of prior 
differentiation of the series. Several semiparametric methods (Robinson, 1995a,b; Abadir 
et al., 2007; etc.) will also be conducted in the paper. In case of Robinson (1995b) the 
method is multivariate and thus, it permits us to test the null that all the d parameters are 
the same, which will give us some insights about the degree of homogeneity of 
persistence of shocks on the variables. Finally, the possibility of structural breaks in the 
context of I(d) models is also considered. This last point is particularly important in our 
framework. As aforementioned, this group of countries have undergone a number of deep 
structural reforms during the transition process from communism to market economies, 
as well as for preparation for EU membership. In addition, some events such as the fact 
of joining the EU, the creation of the euro, or the 2008-2011 financial crisis, may have 
also affected the speed of convergence (or divergence) in their inflation rates with respect 
to the Eurozone. 
3.3 Club convergence 
Finally, in order to test whether our target countries converge to a common inflation rate 
we apply the Phillips and Sul (2007) club convergence procedure. These authors develop 
a technique to test the hypothesis of convergence amongst countries, which allows us to 
group the countries (N = 1,2, … , O) into convergence clubs or clusters. According to 
Phillips and Sul (2007), any panel of individuals, countries, or regions, can be 
decomposed into a common term, P, and an idiosyncratic component, Q: 
                     R = S , " , … , TU′ = PQ
          
   ∀ N, K.                  (13) 
To measure the distance of each country of the panel from the common component, 
Phillips and Sul (2007) propose the squared average transition differential $ $⁄
 
where: 
  $ = T ∑ ℎZ − 1"T[                    (14) 
and  
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         ℎ = Q 
T ∑ QT[3                                          (15) 
is a measure of Q  relative to the panel average, and therefore, the transition of country i 
relative to the panel mean. To identify the idiosyncratic component Q, the authors 
propose the following semiparametric model, 
     Q = Q + \] I(KK^_ ` ,                   (16) 
where ]~NN*(0,1 for all N, L(t) is a time dependent variable and 7 is the speed of 
adjustment. Accordingly, Q converges to Q for any positive value of 7. The null 
hypothesis $!: Q = Q ()* 7 ≥ 0 is tested against the alternative hypothesis $: Q ≠
Q, ∀ 7 ≺ 0. Testing for the null is based upon the following auxiliary regression: 
 log($ $⁄  − 2 log I(K = ê + gZ log(K + J                  (17) 
where log I(K = log(K + 1. The fitted value of log(K is gZ = 27h where
 
αˆ
 
is the 
estimated value of α  under the null hypothesis. Rejection of the null for the whole panel 
does not imply there is not convergence, since it is possible to test, by means of an 
algorithm, whether there are clubs/clusters of convergence. That is, the procedure 
identifies different convergence clubs if it is not possible to identify convergence to a 
common component for all the countries analysed. 
4. Empirical Evidence 
4.1 The data 
The inflation differentials are computed as the difference between the inter-annual 
inflation rate of the country and the inter-annual inflation rate of the Eurozone. The data 
has been downloaded from Eurostat and are based on harmonised Consumer Price 
Indices (CPIs). For all countries we have used monthly observations from 1997:1 to 
2011:7, except Bulgaria, whose sample starts in 1997:12. 
15 
 
 The plots of the inflation differential versus that of the Eurozone are displayed in 
Figure 2. In general, it is possible to observe a clear convergence pattern in the inflation 
rate differentials. Most countries suffered from periods of high inflation at the beginning 
of the sample, with Bulgaria and Romania being the worst cases. We also see a 
significant drop in the inflation differential for most countries at the beginning of 2003, 
due probably to increased inflation in the euro area caused by the “rounding up” of prices 
in euros, during the euro cash changeover (European Central Bank, 2003). Also, we 
observe a significant drop in the inflation rates of the Baltic States, where the 2010 
financial downturn was more damaging for their aggregate demand than the other 
countries. This was preceded by a sudden rise in the inflation rates of the latter countries 
during 2008 and the beginning of 2009, which was mainly caused by food prices and 
housing expenses. In general it would appear that there is evidence of co-movement in 
the inflation rate differential with respect to that of the euro area, which may be an 
indication of a lack of asymmetric shocks affecting the inflation rates of these countries. 
4.2 Results 
The results of the Harvey et al. (2008), Sollis (2009) and the ADF tests are presented in 
Table 2. All the tests have been applied to the raw data, without any deterministic 
component in the auxiliary regressions. The reason for this is that allowing for a constant 
will imply that, if the null is rejected, the inflation series will show a constant gap with 
respect to the inflation rate of the Eurozone. In such a case, concluding that there is 
evidence of convergence will not imply that the same monetary policy should be applied 
to both. 
First, we start by testing the hypothesis of linearity of the inflation differentials 
for each country. According to the second column of Table 2, for only two countries, i.e. 
Hungary and Lithuania, the null of linearity cannot be rejected. For the rest of the 
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countries, the Harvey et al. (2008) test i8 indicates evidence in favour of non-linear 
models. Hence, for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland and Romania we apply 
the Sollis (2009) unit root test for non-linear AESTAR models, whereas for Hungary and 
Lithuania we apply the ADF test.  
 According to the results reported in the last three columns of Table 2, the null of a 
unit root cannot be rejected for three of our target countries; Bulgaria, Latvia and Poland. 
For the rest of the countries, the results indicate that the inflation differentials are non-
linear and globally stationary and, in particular for the Czech Republic and Romania, that 
shocks have asymmetric effects on the variable. The latter finding means that shocks with 
a different sign but of equal magnitude will have different effects, in absolute terms, on 
the target variable. 
 Next we examine the possibility of fractional integration. As earlier mentioned 
unit root methods have the inconvenience that they have extremely low power if the true 
underlying process is I(d) with d different from 0 or 1. Table 3 displays the estimates of d 
for each individual series.  The first two columns refer to the Whittle estimates of d, 
displaying also the 95% confidence band of the non-rejection values of d using 
Robinson’s (1994) parametric approach, first assuming that the error term ut is white 
noise and then allowing for autocorrelation by adopting the nonparametric method of 
Bloomfield (1973).7 The last two columns refer to the semiparametric Whittle method of 
Robinson (1995b) generalized later by Abadir et al. (2007). We present the results here 
for three bandwidth numbers, m = 5, 13 (≅ T0.5) and 20. 
 The first thing we observe in Table 3 is that there is very little evidence of mean 
reversion in the series examined. Thus, we only obtain an estimate of d significantly 
below 1 in the case of Bulgaria for the model with white noise ut. For the remaining 
                                                           
7
  This method produces autocorrelations decaying exponentially as in the AR(MA) cases. 
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cases, we cannot reject the null of I(1) behaviour or, if it is rejected, it is in favour of 
higher degrees of integration. 
 In addition, we present, in Table 4, the results of the Robinson (1995a) log-
periodogram test for fractional integration. In Panel (a) we report the results of the test 
for each country’s inflation rate and that of the Eurozone. The reason for applying the test 
to each individual country’s inflation rate is to analyse how (dis)similar the order of 
integration is across countries. Although the unit root tests reported some cases whereby 
the unit root was rejected, it was not possible to infer anything about how fast or slow the 
series would revert to equilibrium after a shock. In the second column of Panel (a) we 
report the estimated order of integration. Interestingly the euro area’s inflation rate is 
quite close to the unit root, whereas Bulgaria’s inflation rate seems to be stationary. In 
order to test whether shocks have similar effects on the inflation rates, we test for the 
equality of the d parameters. According to this F-test (which is reported in the note to 
Panel (a)), not surprisingly, the hypothesis of equal orders of integration is rejected. In 
Panel (b) we apply the F-test to pairs consisting of each country and the euro area, to 
highlight those countries’ inflation rates with the same order of integration than the 
Eurozone’s inflation rate. The hypothesis of equality of d cannot be rejected for the 
Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, implying that Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania’s inflation rates d are not similar to the d of the euro area’s rate of inflation. 
These results do not pose any contradiction with respect to our findings relating to 
the unit root tests. The unit root tests provide analysis of whether the inflation 
differentials tend to converge to zero after a shock, whilst with the fractional integration 
approach, we test whether the inflation rates react in a similar way after a shock. Hence 
these results have important policy implications. Although Hungary and Romania’s 
inflation differentials appear to be stationary according to the unit root analysis, the 
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results in Table 4 indicate that inflationary shocks experienced by these two countries 
tend to disappear faster than in the euro area. The cases of Latvia and Poland also deserve 
some comment. There was no evidence against the null of a unit root in the results 
reported in Table 2. However, the results presented in Table 4 Panel (b) indicate similar 
order of integration in their inflation rates than that in the euro area. Hence, although 
there is no evidence in favour of the convergence hypothesis, shocks tend to have similar 
effects on the inflation rates in all three, i.e. Latvia, Poland and the Eurozone. 
Still in the context of fractional integration, the possibility of breaks in the data is 
also examined. This is a relevant issue since it has been argued by many authors that 
fractional integration might be an artificial artifact generated by the presence of breaks in 
the data (see, e.g., Cheung, 1993; Diebold and Inoue, 2001; Giraitis et al., 2001; Mikosch 
and Starica, 2004; Granger and Hyung , 2004; etc.). Table 5 displays for each series the 
number of breaks, along with the estimates of the break dates and the fractional 
differencing parameters for each subsample using the procedure developed by Gil-Alana 
(2008). This method is based on minimising the residuals sum of squares for different 
subsamples assuming that the break dates are endogenously determined by the model.8 
The results suggest that there are no breaks in the cases of Latvia and Romania; a single 
break in case of Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, and two breaks are detected for Lithuania 
and the Czech Republic. Once more the results indicate little evidence of mean reversion, 
and although some estimates are found to be below unity the unit root null cannot be 
rejected. Interestingly, the breaks are quite close in time across countries, i.e. around the 
date of the creation of the euro and close to the end of the period, probably caused by the 
financial crisis. Also, it is worth mentioning that none of the breaks seem to be related to 
joining the EU or the ERM II (for the case of Lithuania). In all cases, it appears that the 
                                                           
8
  It uses a grid of values for the fractional differencing parameters and for the break dates. 
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creation of the euro generated a higher degree of dispersion between the Eurozone and 
our target countries. Furthermore, the years of the financial crisis have decreased slightly 
the speed of mean reversion. The latter phenomenon can be justified by the fast drop in 
the inflation differential with respect to the Eurozone, just after the initial shock in 2007.  
Finally, we test, by means of the Phillips and Sul (2007) club convergence test, if 
the series of inflation of the CEECs candidates to adopt the euro, tend to converge to a 
common steady state. The null hypothesis is hence convergence to a common steady 
state. This is done by comparing the t-statistic of the log(K coefficient in the auxiliary 
regression (17) with the critical value -1.65, for different groups of countries. In our case 
the t-statistic is -1.62, which is greater than the critical value, when Bulgaria is excluded; 
hence we cannot reject the null hypothesis that this group of countries, with the exception 
of Bulgaria, form a convergence club. 
The results obtained highlight important policy implications for the future of the 
Eurozone, and for these countries. Bulgaria is a clear candidate to wait longer before 
adopting the euro, this is perhaps not surprising given it only became a member state in 
2007. The results point against the convergence hypothesis and the order of integration of 
Bulgaria’s inflation rate is much lower than the euro area. This does not mean that 
Bulgaria is not doing things right, but for their own self interest they should have the 
possibility to accommodate differently to inflationary shocks than the euro area. The 
Czech Republic is probably one of the most clear cases of similarity of inflationary 
shocks with the euro area, along with Lithuania, which basically implies that losing their 
monetary policy will not, in principle, pose major problems in case of asymmetric macro 
shocks. Hungary and Romania are interesting case studies. Both countries inflation rates 
have seemed to converge to the inflation rate of the Eurozone, however, according to the 
results of Table 4, there is still some danger of hazardous effects of asymmetric shocks. 
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Latvia and Poland also seem to be similar to the euro area in the way they react to 
inflationary shocks, although there is not statistical evidence in favour of the convergence 
hypothesis. This is a positive sign though for their future within an enlarged euro area. 
5. Conclusions 
Focusing upon a group of CEECs which at some point will have to adopt the single 
currency is of policy relevance given that these countries do not have an opt-out clause 
and so will eventually relinquish control of monetary policy. If there is evidence of 
persistence in the inflation rate differential between a country and the Eurozone then this 
may lead to asymmetric macro shocks which could be difficult to deal with if there are 
large underlying differences in this key macro indicator between a specific country and 
the Eurozone. Whilst three out of the seven countries show persistence in their inflation 
rate differential to the Euro, employing fractional integration tests reveals that there are 
differences in the speed of adjustment in the inflation rates. Further tests reveal that the 
CEECs inflation rates converge to a common steady state. Out of the seven CEECs our 
findings imply that Bulgaria should delay adoption of the euro and there is evidence that 
Hungary and Romania may be vulnerable to asymmetric shocks. 
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TABLE 1: GDP PER CAPITA IN PURCHASING POWER STANDARDS, INDEX EU-27 = 100 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Euro area (17 countries) 113 113 112 112 111 110 109 109 109 109 108 108 108 
Belgium 123 123 126 124 125 124 121 120 118 116 115 117 119 
Bulgaria 27 28 28 30 32 34 35 37 38 40 43 44 44 
Czech Republic 73 72 71 73 73 77 78 79 80 83 84 84 82 
Denmark 132 131 132 128 128 124 126 124 124 123 123 121 125 
Germany 122 121 118 116 115 116 115 116 115 116 115 115 117 
Estonia 42 43 45 46 50 55 57 62 66 70 69 64 64 
Ireland 122 127 132 134 139 142 143 145 146 148 133 128 127 
Greece 83 83 84 86 90 93 94 91 92 90 92 93 88 
Spain 95 96 97 98 100 101 101 102 105 105 103 103 100 
France 115 115 115 115 115 111 110 110 108 108 106 107 107 
Italy 120 118 118 118 112 111 107 105 105 104 104 104 100 
Cyprus 86 87 88 90 88 88 89 90 91 92 97 98 97 
Latvia 36 36 36 38 41 43 46 48 51 56 56 52 52 
Lithuania 40 39 40 42 44 49 51 53 56 59 61 55 58 
Luxembourg 218 238 245 234 240 248 253 254 270 275 278 267 274 
Hungary 54 54 54 58 61 63 63 63 63 62 64 64 63 
Malta 80 81 85 79 81 80 78 78 76 76 78 80 83 
Netherlands 129 131 134 134 133 129 129 131 131 132 133 131 133 
Austria 132 132 132 126 127 128 128 125 126 124 124 125 126 
Poland 48 49 48 48 48 49 51 51 52 54 56 61 62 
Portugal 79 81 81 80 80 79 77 79 79 79 78 80 81 
Romania 27 26 26 28 29 31 34 35 38 42 47 46 45 
Slovenia 79 81 80 80 82 84 87 87 88 88 91 88 86 
Slovakia 52 51 50 52 54 55 57 60 63 68 72 73 74 
Finland 114 115 117 115 115 113 116 114 114 118 118 114 116 
Sweden 123 126 128 122 122 124 126 122 123 125 123 119 123 
United Kingdom 118 118 119 120 121 122 124 122 120 116 114 113 114 
Source: Eurostat. Bold text denotes CEECs. 
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TABLE 2: LINEARITY AND UNIT ROOT TESTS RESULTS 
Country Wλ Sollis Asymmetry ADF 
Bulgaria 74.866** 2.087 – – 
Czech Republic 46.041** 11.102** 2.630** – 
Hungary 0.469 – – -3.100** 
Latvia 14.042** 1.382 – – 
Lithuania 1.105 – – -1.714* 
Poland 39.926** 2.059 – – 
Romania 74.214** 19.572** 5.124** – 
Note: The symbols * and ** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 and 10% respectively. The lag 
length for the unit root tests has been obtained by means of the Modified Akaike Information Criterion 
proposed by Ng and Perron (1995). The critical values are as follows: 
 
 χ
2(2) Sollis t-statistic ADF 
5% 5.990 4.886 1.960 -1.942 
10% 4.600 4.009 1.645 -1.615 
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TABLE 3: ESTIMATES OF THE FRACTIONAL DIFFERENCING PARAMETER 
Country PARAMETRIC NON-
PARAMETRIC 
SEMI-PARAMETRIC 
Robinson, 1994 
White noise ut 
Robinson, 1994 
Autocorrelated ut 
m  = 5    
 
m  = 13   
 
m  = 20    
 
Bulgaria 0.804* 
(0.681, 0.958) 
0.679 
(0.402, 1.094) 
0.723 1.384** 1.303** 
Czech Republic 1.143** 
(1.049, 1.270) 
1.100 
(0.920, 1.325) 
0.898 1.179 1.477** 
Hungary 1.006 
(0.913, 1.130) 
0.970 
(0.798, 1.201) 
0.705 1.038 1.341** 
Latvia 1.096** 
(1.019, 1.195) 
1.243** 
(1.063, 1.469) 
0.671 1.431** 1.488** 
Lithuania 0.940 
(0.854, 1.054) 
0.920 
(0.760, 1.121) 
1.116 1.342** 1.227** 
Poland 1.002 
(0.908, 1.129) 
0.919 
(0.774, 1.139) 
1.048 1.182 1.493** 
Romania 1.413** 
(1.296, 1.554) 
1.394** 
(1.111, 1.822) 
0.910 0.784 1.087 
Note: The values in parenthesis in the second and third column refer to the 95% confidence band of the non-
rejection values of d using Robinson’s (1994) tests. The symbols * means evidence of mean reversion (i.e., 
d<1) and ** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of d=1 in favour of the alternative of d>1. For the 3rd, 4rd 
and 5th columns the 95% confidence intervals corresponding to the I(1) hypothesis are respectively (0.632, 
1.367), (0.771, 1.228) and (0.816, 1.184). 
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TABLE 4: ROBINSON (1995B) FRACTIONAL INTEGRATION TESTS 
PANEL (A): Estimation of d for inflation rates 
Country Estimated d Standard error p-value 
Bulgaria 0.444 0.690 0.00 
Czech Republic 1.113 0.690 0.00 
Hungary 0.829 0.690 0.00 
Latvia 1.195 0.690 0.00 
Lithuania 1.025 0.690 0.00 
Poland 0.885 0.690 0.00 
Romania 0.713 0.690 0.00 
Eurozone 0.911 0.690 0.00 
Note: F-tests for equality of d coefficients; F(7,728) =  11.818,   Prob > F = 0.0000. 
 
PANEL (B): Tests for equality of d coefficients for inflation rates vs the Eurozone 
Pair F p-value 
Bulgaria 35.944 0.000 
Czech Republic 0.401 0.527 
Hungary 8.040 0.005 
Latvia 0.123 0.725 
Lithuania 1.939 0.165 
Poland 1.242 0.266 
Romania 22.501 0.000 
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TABLE 5: FRACTIONAL INTEGRATION AND BREAKS 
 No. of 
breaks 
Break dates d1 d2 d3 
Bulgaria 1 2000m7 0.798 
(0.579, 1.119) 
1.247** 
(1.093, 1.453) 
– 
Czech Republic 2 1999m1 & 2008m1 0.927 
(0.607, 1.353) 
1.212** 
(1.068, 1.415) 
0.828 
(0.645, 1.111) 
Hungary 1 2007m1 1.049 
(0.948, 1.186) 
0.963 
(0.772, 1.237) 
– 
Latvia 0 – 1.096** 
(1.019, 1.195) 
– – 
Lithuania 2 1999m10 & 2009m1 0.805 
(0.579, 1.200) 
1.085 
(0.985, 1.230) 
0.911 
(0.709, 1.215) 
Poland 1 2000m7 0.951 
(0.771, 1.233) 
0.959 
(0.844, 1.112) 
– 
Romania 0 – 1.413** 
(1.296, 1.554) 
– – 
Note: ** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of d = 1 in favour of the alternative of d >1. d1, d2 and d3 show the order of 
integration for each of the period(s) before the break(s) in the series. 
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FIGURE 1: BUDGET BALANCE IN % OF GDP, SEASONALLY ADJUSTED, 
QUARTERLY 
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FIGURE 2: INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS 
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